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INTRODUCTION
The RookerwFeldman doctrine is the product of two cases decided by
the Supreme Court six decades apart: appropriately, Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co.' and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.' Stated in
its simplest and most uncontroversial form, the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine provides that federal courts other than the Supreme Court lack
jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions.' This conclu-
sion is based on inferences drawn from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257 and 1331.4
In practice, lower federal courts are using Rooker-Feldman in a wide va-
riety of circumstances to conclude that they are unable to hear cases
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263 U.S. 413 (1923). Rookeris discussed in detail infra in Part IIA.
460 U.S. 462 (1983). Feldman is discussed in detail infra in Part II.B.
Some xariation on this definition is common in case law and scholarly literature.
Se; .g.,Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (noting that under Rooker.
Fdman "a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would
be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court"); ASARCO
Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28
U.S.C. § 1257 as ordinarily barring direct review in the lower federal courts of a deci-
sion reached by the highest state court, for such authority is vested solely in this
Court."); Thomas D. Rowe,Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder To Blow It Up,
74 NOTRE DAwiE L. REV. 1081, 1081-82 (1999) ("[F]ederal district courts lack jurisdic-
tion to entertain claims that are 'inextricably intertwined' with the merits of a judg-
ment already rendered by a state court system .... ."); Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shop-
ping forArbitration Decisions. Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 138 (1998) ("[Flederal courts lackjurisdiction to review or sit as
an appellate court over state court decisions."). Rooker-Feldman is discussed in greater
detail infra in Parts II and IX.B.
Section 1257 grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state court deci-
sions and § 1331 grants original jurisdiction to federal district courts. The inferences
supporting the RookerwFeldman conclusion are that the grant of appellate jurisdiction in
these matters to the Supreme Court is exclusive and that the grant of original jurisdic-
tion to district courts precludes appellate jurisdiction.
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in which prior state courtjudgments are implicated.'
Despite receiving very little treatment by the Supreme Court,"
Rooker-Feldman has experienced "explosive growth" in lower federal
courts, where the number of cases relying on the doctrine is astonish-
ing.7 This growth has led to some questionable and controversial out-
comes.8 A few critics have responded,9 almost uniformly concluding
See, e.g., Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (challenge to bar rules); In re Audre, Inc.,
216 B.R. 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (bankruptcy); Davis v. Allen County Office of Family
& Children, No. 96-1953, 1997 WL 267863 (7th Cir. May 6, 1997) (paternity); Kamile-
wicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (legal malpractice); Beckford
v. Citibank N.A., No. 00 Civ. 205 DLC, 2000 WL 1585684 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000)
(mortgage foreclosure); Young v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 116 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (election procedure).
6 Since Feldman, the Supreme Court has mentioned the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in
three cases, seeDe Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1005; ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 622-23; Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987); id. at 18 (ScaliaJ., concurring); id. at 21 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 24-26 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment);
id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens,J., concurring
in judgment), and has cited Rooker and Feldman together to support a similar proposi-
tion two other times, see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990) (citing Rooker
and Feldman to support the "rule that a federal district court cannot entertain an origi-
nal action alleging that a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an un-
constitutional state statute"); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Rooker and Feldman to support the proposition that "permitting
collateral attacks also leads to the anomaly that courts will, on occasion, be required to
sit in review ofjudgments entered by other courts of equal-or even greater-author-
ity"). Supreme Court treatment of Rooker-Feldman is discussed in greater detail infra in
Part II.C.
7 Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
in Action, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1085, 1088 (1999). Sherry asserts that "[s]ince 1990
alone, lower federal courts have used Rooker-Feldman to find jurisdiction lacking in
more than 500 cases." Id. The number of lower federal court cases mentioning the
doctrine is significantly higher: recent Westlaw searches revealed 929 lower federal
court cases mentioning Rooker-Feldman. According to Westlaw's KeyCite service and
Lexis's Shepard's service, Rooker and Feldman have been cited approximately 1200 and
1500 times, respectively.
8 See, for example, Kamilewvicz v. Bank of Boston Cop., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996),
discussed infra in Part II.D, in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was used, arguably
incorrectly, to dismiss an apparently meritorious case.
A review of the academic literature suggests that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
largely overlooked. Remarkably little has been written about Rooker-Feldman. See grner-
ally Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1175, 1176 n.4 (1999) (discussing scholarly treatment of the doc-
trine). A few articles on related topics such as preclusion or antisuit injunctions have
mentioned it, see, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Wtits
Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 454 (2000); Stemlight, supra note 3, at 138-40, and it has
been the source of occasional student notes, see, e.g., Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 627 (1987); Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 859 (1990), but the
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that Rooker-Feldman should be abolished. Nevertheless, it appears un-
likely that the doctrine will disappear in the near future.0 Thus, refin-
ing-and, if necessary, redefining-the doctrine is an important goal.
This Comment examines the present usage of Rooker-Feldman and
the criticisms it has engendered and attempts to establish a clear theo-
retical role for the doctrine. Part I introduces several other doctrines
that are relevant to a discussion of Rooker-Feldman. Part II examines
the history and present usage of Rooker-Feldman. Part III discusses the
two major criticisms of Rooker-Feldman as it is presently applied: that it
is duplicative and that it leads to bad results. Part IV presents a con-
ceptual framework for Rooker-Feldman and reconsiders the objections
discussed in Part III in light of that framework, concluding that the
scholarly criticisms are misguided and that Rooker-Feldman, properly
applied, avoids the problems currently associated with the doctrine.
Finally, Part V offers a hypothetical situation indicating when and how
this framework would apply in practice.
I. OTHER RELEVANT DOCTRINES
Rooker-Feldman necessarily arises in interjurisdictional contexts in
which other doctrines, such as preclusion and abstention, also apply.
Before addressing Rooker-Feldman in any detail, it is important to con-
sider these other doctrines to provide context for the discussion. As
discussed below, one of the major criticisms of Rooker-Feldman is that it
"does no work"1' because all of the good outcomes it creates would be
created anyway by some combination of the doctrines discussed here.1
2
A basic understanding of these other doctrines is necessary before this
criticism can be evaluated.
bulk of the work on the subject has come in the form of a symposium published in
1999. Symposium, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999).
Professor Wright's treatise now addresses the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 18 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469.1 (Supp. 2000), but
the casebook with "the most extensive treatment of Rooker-Feldman in any book now on
the market," Rowe, supra note 3, at 1083, contains only nine pages of coverage, see
MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QLIESTIONS 575-84 (4th ed. 1998).
" See, Bandes, supra note 9, at 1179 n.19 (asserting that although she would like
federal courts to "jettison the doctrine entirely," she is "not hopeful"); Jack M. Beer-
mann, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAmE L.
REV. 1209, 1233 (1999) ("[I t seems to me that it is very unlikely that either Congress
or the Court will overrule the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.").
i Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74
NoTRE DAMIE L. REr,. 1129, 1147 (1999).
, See infra Part I1LA (discussing this objection).
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The first relevant set of doctrines is the preclusion doctrines: res
judicata (or claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (or issue preclu-
sion). The details of these doctrines vary across jurisdictions, but res
judicata generally bars parties or their privies from asserting claims
that were raised or could have been raised in prior litigation arising
from the same nucleus of operative facts, while collateral estoppel
precludes relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and neces-
sarily decided in prior litigation. These doctrines address the issue of
how courts should treat prior judgments and protect the rights of par-
ties established by litigation. They save resources, create finality and
certainty, and protect winning parties from harassment. In practice,
the relationship between the preclusion doctrines and Rooker-Feldman
has been difficult to define.1
3
There are several sources of law relating to the preclusion doc-
trines, especially in interjurisdictional contexts. In suits within a single
jurisdiction, the preclusion law of that jurisdiction generally governs
subsequent cases. When a judgment is rendered in one state and a
subsequent suit is filed in another, the second state is obliged, under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Full Faith and Credit statute,
to give the judgment of the first state at least as much preclusive effect
as it would receive in the first state. 4 If the subsequent suit is filed in
federal court rather than in another state, the preclusion law of the
rendering state still applies, under the Full Faith and Credit statute."
13 See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween the doctrines).
14 U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1994) ("Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof.., shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Terri-
tories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken."); Howard M. Erichson, Inteijurisdictional Pre-
clusion, 96 MICH. L. REv. 945, 984 (1998) ("In the state-state interjurisdictional con-
figuration... ajudgment's binding effect is founded both on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and on the corresponding statute."). There are exceptions to this rule: for ex-
ample, the court of the second state need not give the judgment. of the first state full
effect if that judgment was not validly rendered. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) ("Ajudgment rendered in violation of due
process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit else-
where.").
15 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 380 (1985) (noting that § 1738 "'commands a federal court to accept the rules
chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken'" (quoting Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982))). This is relevant to Rooker-Feldman because
this is the situation-a state courtjudgment followed by a federal suit-in which Rooker-
Feldman arises.
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Finally, the source of law governing the preclusive effects of federal
judgments appears to be federal common law. 6
The second relevant set of doctrines is the abstention doctrines.
7
These doctrines allow federal courts, in certain circumstances, to ab-
stain from exercising their jurisdiction in the interests of federalism
and comity. Federal courts can abstain and require litigants to initiate
state court suits", or they can abstain and defer to ongoing state suits. 9
Abstention doctrines address interactions between federal and state
courts and instruct federal courts about when it is or is not proper to
hear certain cases. This Comment will argue that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine serves a similar function after state suits have ended. "o
Finally, it is important to note two other powers of federal courts:
injunction of state suits under the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act (most notably the relitigation exception)2 1 and removal of cases
based on the authority conferred by the All Writs Act.22 These proce-
.Segowrally Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1021, 1028
(2001) ("In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dis-
missal by a federal court sitting in diversity."); Stephen B. Burbank, Interurisdictional
Pwrlusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 733 (1986). This issue is not particularly relevant to a discussion of
the RookerFddman doctrine. For discussions of interjurisdictional preclusion, see gen-
erally Burbank, supra, and Erichson, supra note 14.
These include Pullman and Burford abstentions, discussed infra in note 18, and
l'oungkrand Colorado Riverabstentions, discussed infra in note 19.
In Pulhnan abstention stays a federal case when state law is unclear and a favorable
decision on state law will eliminate the need for the federal court to decide a constitu-
tional question. R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). Burford absten-
tion allows federal courts to abstain from determining important state regulatory issues
if state courts are, under state law, part of the regulatory process. Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943).
I, 'ounger abstention prohibits federal courts from enjoining ongoing state suits
based on a claim that the underlying prosecution is unconstitutional. Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). Colorado River abstention allows a federal court to de-
cline to hear a case in the interest of "wise judicial administration." Colo. River Water
Consernation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
- This argument is developed infra in notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunc-
tio rn to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments."). For a detailed history of the Anti-Injunction Act, see generally Mitchum v.
loqIr, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972). The final exception, "to protect or effectuate its
judgment,," is commonly referred to as the relitigation exception. This exception is
the most relevant to a discussion of Rookei Feldman and is discussed in greater detail
intfra in Part IV.A.
"1 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1994) ("The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."). Federal courts occa-
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dures, like the abstention doctrines, are animated by the policies of
federalism and comity. They, too, address interactions between state
and federal courts, specifically relating to state court suits that
threaten prior federal judgments. This Comment will argue that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine roughly mirrors these powers because a fed-
eral court deciding whether it lacks jurisdiction to hear a case based
on Rooker-Feldman is making a judgment similar to the one it would
make when considering whether to enjoin a state suit under the reliti-
gation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act or whether to permit re-
moval of a suit based on the All Writs Act.2 3
II. THE ROOKER-FELDANDOCTRINE
This Part will begin with a discussion of the two cases that are cen-
tral to the doctrine, Rooker and Feldman. It will then discuss the subse-
quent treatment of the doctrine by the Supreme Court and by lower
federal courts, noting some of the major questions that remain unan-
swered and introducing some of the ways Rooker-Feldman is being used.
A. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
Dora and William Rooker entered into a trust agreement with Fi-
delity Trust Company on October 11, 1909.24 A dispute over the con-
tract arose and, on October 30, 1912, the Rookers brought an action
in an Indiana circuit court.2 The trial court interpreted the trust
agreement as a mortgage and ordered a foreclosure sale.6 On appeal,
the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the instrument at issue
was "an absolute deed of trust" rather than "a deed of trust in the na-
ture of a mortgage" and accordingly reversed the decision of the trial
27
court and granted the Rookers' motion for a new trial .
In the subsequent proceeding, Fidelity Trust Co. prevailed again,
this time under the law of trusts. The trial court held that Fidelity
sionally use this power to permit removal of cases. See, e.g., Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F.
Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("Alternatively, the Court has jurisdiction of the
claims against Sullivan by virtue of the All Writs Act ...."). This practice is arguably
based on a misreading of the relevant statutes, resulting in an overextension of federal
jurisdiction. See generally Hoffman, supra note 9, at 455 (criticizing this practice).
23 This argument is developed in greater detail infra in Part r.A
24 Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 109 N.E. 766, 766 (Ind. 1915).
25 Id. at 768.
26 Id. at 768-69.
27 Id. at 770.
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"ha[d] not mismanaged, repudiated, or abandoned its trust, but ha[d]
faithfully performed its duties as trustee under the deeds and trust
agreement set out in the pleadings and special findings... and [held]
the legal tide to said lands as trustee for the sole purpose of completing
its duties and obligations as such trustee by making sale of the same and
by making distribution of the proceeds according to the terms of said
deeds and trust agreement, and not otherwse, and in no other capac-
The Rookers appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, which con-
cluded that "[n]o reversible error [was] shown in the record" and af-
firmed the judgment. The Rookers petitioned for a rehearing, alleg-
ing that the state statute in question violated the federal Constitution,
but the petition was denied." The United States Supreme Court then
denied certiorari."" "[A]t the solicitation of the plaintiffs," however,
the ChiefJustice of the Indiana Supreme Court allowed a writ of error
to the United States Supreme Court.2'
The Rookers asserted two arguments for the writ of error. They
first contended that the vlidity of the state statute had been chal-
lenged in state court, thus allowing Supreme Court review of the con-
stitutionality of the state statute. Second, they argued that the deci-
sion in the second appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court "took and
applied a view of the trust agreement different from that taken and
announced on the first appeal,"3 thereby violating the Contract
Clause" as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 In response, Fidelity challenged the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, arguing that "the case is not one
Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 773 (Ind. 1921) (quoting the trial
court opinion, which is reprinted in its entirety in the appellate decision), cert. denied,
259 U.S. 580 (1922), writ of eror dismissed by 261 U.S. 114 (1923).
Id. at 776.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (Rooker 1), 261 U.S. 114, 117 (1923) ("[A]fter the
judgment of affirmance the plaintiffs sought to raise the question [of the constitution-
ality of the state statute] by a petition for rehearing, which was denied without opin-
ion.").
q Se Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 259 U.S. 580 (1922) (denying certiorari); 259
U.S. 577 (1922) (same).
-o R, oke 1, 261 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 117.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall.., pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post tacto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.... ").
Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to an) person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."); see Rooker 1, 261 U.S. at 116-18 (evaluating both the
Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause arguments).
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the judgment in which may be reviewed... on writ of error.":" The
Court agreed and dismissed the Rookers' claims.
On the first issue, the Court examined the record and concluded
that the challenge to the constitutionality of the state statute had not
been timely raised.37 On the second issue, the Court stated that the
Rookers' argument "amounted to nothing more than saying that in
the plaintiffs' opinion the court should follow the first decision," and
as such it "did not draw in question the validity of an authority exer-
cised under a State."3 "Plainly," the Court concluded, "this claim does
not bring the case within the writ of error provision."' Accordingly,
the writ of error was dismissed.
The Rookers then filed suit in federal district court, presenting "a
bill in equity to have a judgment of a circuit court in Indiana, which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, declared null and
void."0 The bill was based on the same constitutional claims dis-
missed by the Supreme Court for lack ofjurisdiction:
The grounds advanced for resorting to the District Court are that the
judgment was rendered and affirmed in contravention of the contract
clause of the Constitution of the United States and the due process of
law and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that
it gave effect to a state statute alleged to be in conflict with those clauses
and did not give effect to a prior decision in the same cause by the Su-
preme Court of the State ....
The district court dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction and the
Rookers appealed directly to the Supreme Court.'
14
The Court held that "the suit is so plainly not within the District
Court's jurisdiction as defined by Congress that [Fidelity's] motion to
affirm must be sustained.4  The Court reasoned that
[i]f the constitutional questions stated in the bill [that is, the federal bill
in equity] actually arose in the cause [that is, the state case], it was the
province and duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision,
whether right or wrong, was an exercise ofjurisdiction. If the decision
was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open
36 Rookerl, 261 U.S. at 117.
37 Id. ("It is at least doubtful that the question is one of any substance, but its tardy
presentation renders further notice of it unnecessary.").
38 Id. at 118.
39 Id.
40 Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co. (RookerorRookerII), 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923).
41 Id. at 414-15.
42 Id. at 415.
3 Id.
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to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate pro-
ceeding. Unless and until so reversed or modified, it would be an effec-
tive and conclusive adjudication. Under the legislation of Congress, no
court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a pro-
ceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character.
To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Thejurisdiction
possessed by the District Courts is strictly original. 4
Oddly, the Court's analysis assumed that the state court had addressed
the constitutional questions, when in fact, it had not. ' Ten months
earlier, the Court itself had dismissed the claim that the state statute
was unconstitutional specifically because it had not been timely raised
in the state proceedings. "6 So, it would have been impossible for the
Indiana Supreme Court to consider claims that its judgment violated
the Constitution (except perhaps in a rehearing, which was denied in
this case). Thus, despite its language, Rooker appears to be more like a
collateral attack on a state court judgment than an appeal of a state
court judgment.
In an), event, whether or not the assumptions were counterfactual,
the Court in Rooker held that federal district courts cannot review deci-
sions of the highest state courts because only the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to engage in such review. This holding was based on in-
ferences drawn from the precursors to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257 and 1331,
which grant jurisdiction to review certain state court judgments to the
Supreme Court and original jurisdiction to federal district courts, re-
spectively. 7 Rookerwas not particularly influential, and it was cited in-
frequently over subsequent decades.'
Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
S"rRookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769 (Ind. 1921) (failing to address any
constitutional issues).
1" RookrL 261 U.S. at 117.
17 The inference draxn from § 1257 is that no other court has the power to en-
gage in such review. The inference drawn from § 1331 is that the grant of original ju-
risdiction precludes any appellate jurisdiction. One commentator has presented a
third, nonstatutory basis for the decision in Rooker. that trial courts should not have
the power to destroy each others'judgments. Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the
Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, ResJudicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 1337,
1350 (1980). Indeed, this policy rationale probably contributed to both the creation
of the statutes and the decision in Rookerin the first place.
1 Prior to the Court's 1983 decision in Feldman, Rooker was cited by the Court only
two times. Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960, 961 (1971) (White, J., dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,
328 U.S. 275, 283 (1946). Incidentally, RookerIIwas by no means the end of the litiga-
tion surTounding the plot of land and the trust. See, e.g., Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
141 N.E. 4, 4 (Ind. 1923) (denying an appeal from "an order approving a lease of cer-
tain tillable land, part of the trust estate, to one Thomas West for the crop year of
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B. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
Six decades later, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman.49 The case arose when Marc Feldman, who
had not attended law school but had been admitted to the bar in both
Virginia and Maryland, sought admission to the bar by waiver in Wash-
ington, D.C.50 The Committee on Admissions of the District of Co-
lumbia Bar denied his application because it was in violation of a Dis-
trict of Columbia bar admission rule requiring applicants to have
graduated from an accredited law school.5' The Committee acknowl-
edged that waiver was possible, but stated that only the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, the highest court in the jurisdiction, could
waive the graduation requirement." Accordingly, Feldman submitted
a petition to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on June 13,
1977, seeking admission without examination or, alternatively, to be
allowed to sit for the bar examination.s After several months of inac-
tivity, Feldman's counsel wrote a letter to the ChiefJudge of the Court
of Appeals urging action on the petition and suggesting that "'barring
Mr. Feldman from the practice of law merely because he has not
graduated from an accredited law school would raise important ques-
1922"); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 145 N.E. 493, 494 (Ind. 1924) (affirming "the is-
suance of a writ of assistance to enforce compliance with a former judgment of [the
state trial court], which judgment was affirmed by this court"); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 151 N.E. 610, 611 (Ind. 1926) (denying an appeal "from an order and decree
which confirmed a sale theretofore ordered by the court in its final decree, which set-
fled the rights of the parties"); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 177 N.E. 454, 458 (Ind.
1931) (vacating ajudgment rendered by the Tipton Circuit Court while the matter was
still pending before the Hamilton Circuit Court, though ordering the Hamilton Cir-
cuit Court "to adopt the finding of the Tipton circuit court and enterjudgment remov-
ing [Fidelity] as trustee"); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 5 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. Ct. App.
1936) (en banc) (denying an appeal from ajudgment striking the complaint from the
files).
4 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
SO Id. at 465. For an interesting discussion of Feldman's colorful subsequent ca-
reer path, see Beermann, supra note 10, at 1210 n.3. Feldman's case was reviewed
simultaneously (though not technically consolidated) with that of Edward J. Hickey,
Jr., whose allegations and prayer for relief "were virtually identical to the allegations
and prayer for relief in Feldman's complaint." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 472-73.
See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 464-65 ("'Under no circumstances shall an applicant be
admitted to the bar without having first submitted to the Secretary to the Committee
[on Admissions] a certificate verifying that he has graduated from an approved law
school."' (quoting D.C. CT. APP. R. 461(b) (3) (alteration in original))).
52 Id. at 466. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, though technically not a
state court, is treated as a "highest court of a state" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 464.
53 Id. at 466.
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fions under the United States Constitution and the federal antitrust
laws.""' On March 30, 1978, Feldman's petition was denied by a per
curiam order of the Court.'
Feldman then filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging
constitutional and federal antitrust violations. The district court held
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review an order of another
jurisdiction's highest court, "reasoning that the Court of Appeals' rul-
ings on the applications for waivers were judicial in nature, and as
such were reviewable only in the Supreme Court of the United
States."'" Feldman sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of the antitrust
claims " but reversed the dismissal of the constitutional claims be-
cause, in its view, the waiver proceedings were notjudicial in nature.58
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the constitutional
claims"' and vacated the judgment of the circuit court. ° While noting
that "[t]he District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that
the United States District Court is without authority to review final de-
terminations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial
proceedings," " the Court ultimately disagreed with the circuit court,
concluding that the petitions for waiver "were judicial in nature.""2
Therefore, the Court held, the district court lacked jurisdiction over
Feldman's complaint to the extent that it "sought review in District
Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' denial" of his pe-
tition.""
The Court also held, however, that the district court had subject
matterjurisdiction over Feldman's complaint "[t] o the extent that [it]
mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of [the bar ad-
mission rule]."'" The Court distinguished "'a constitutional challenge
to the state's general rules and regulations governing admission"'
from "'a claim, based on constitutional or other grounds, that the
Id. at 466-67 (quoting Feldman's counsel's letter).
Id. at 468.
Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
:' Id. at 1298, 1308.
Id. at 1298, 1310, 1317, 1319.
Certiorari was denied as to the antitrust claims. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 474 n.ll.
Id. at 488.
, Id. at 476.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 482.
' Id. at 482-83.
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state has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission.""' In
making this distinction, the Court held that district courts have juris-
diction over the former but not the latter because general challenges
ask district courts "to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a
nonjudicial proceeding."6 Consequently, the allegations that the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily, denying Feldman
due process of law-that is, that the court's judicial action caused
Feldman's injury-were "inextricably intertwined" with the court's de-
cision in a judicial proceeding and as such were not within the juris-
diction of the district court. The allegations generally attacking the
constitutionality of the bar admission rule, however, were permissible
because they did not "require review of ajudicial decision in a particu-
lar case., 67 Various aspects of this distinction have given rise to much
of the confusion currently surrounding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
C. Supreme Court Treatment ofRooker-Feldman Since Feldman
The Supreme Court has found few occasions to address Rooker-
Feldman since deciding Feldman.6 Although Rooker is cited occasionally
for its statement of the principle behind § 1257,6' ' members of the
Court have mentioned the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in only three70
cases. Two other cases, while not referring to Rooker-Feldman per se,
65 Id. at 485 (quoting Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir. 1976)).
Id. at 486.
67 Id. at 487.
68 See supra note 6 (discussing Supreme Court treatment of the doctrine).
69 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 177 (1997)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, in Rooker, the Supreme Court interpreted the
statutory predecessors of § 1257 when it held that cross-system appellate authority is
outside of the domain of lower federal courts).7 0 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (considering the
"Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine" and finding it "inapt"); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 622-23 (1989) (noting that when plaintiffs who would not have had
standing to raise a constitutional challenge in a federal proceeding challenged a state
statute on constitutional grounds in a state proceeding, dismissal of the case with in-
structions for petitioners to sue in federal trial court would "represent a partial inroad
on Rooker-Feldman's construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1257"); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987) (noting that the lower federal courts considered the Rooke-
Feldman doctrine); id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the "so-called Rookne-
Feldman doctrine" did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction); id. at 21 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (concluding that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because Tex-
aco's § 1983 action did not "challenge the merits of the Texas suit"); id. at 24-26 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the claims were "inextricably intertwined" with a Texas state judgment); id, at
28 (Blackmun,J., concurring injudgment) (noting that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the
THE ROOKER-FELDMANDOCTRINE
•• 71have cited both Rookerand Feldman to support a similar proposition.
The first of these cases was Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., decided in
1987.7, All six opinions in Pennzoil mentioned the doctrine,7 but only
Justice Marshall argued that it barred the district court from hearing
Texaco's constitutional challenge to Texas state procedures for en-
forcement of Pennzoil's state-court judgment.74 Ironically, Justice
Marshall's discussion, in which no other Justices joined and with
which all of the otherjustices disagreed,7 5 is the most extensive formu-
lation of the doctrine by a member of the Court since Feldman. He of-
fered the following analysis:
W%'hile the question whether a federal constitutional challenge is inextri-
cably intertwined with the merits of a state-court judgment may some-
times be difficult to answer, it is apparent, as a first step, that the federal
claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the fed-
eral claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly de-
cided the issues before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated
upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to con-
ceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a pro-
hibited appeal of the state-court judgment.76
Justice Marshall's analysis, though not his conclusion, is similar to
Feldman. Feldman prohibited review of state judicial actions by federal
courts other than the Supreme Court; Justice Marshall in Pennzoil
collateral review sought by Texaco); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(noting that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the federal claims).
70 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990) (citing both Rooker and Feldman
to support the "rule that a federal district court cannot entertain an original action al-
leging that a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitu-
tijmal state statute"); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (citing Rooker and Feldman to support the proposition that "permitting collat-
eral attacks also leads to the anomaly that courts will, on occasion, be required to sit in
revicw ofjudgments entered by other courts of equal-or even greater-authority").
7-, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
Sir suipra note 70.
Pi zoil, 481 U.S. at 24-26 (Marshall,J., concurring).
Marshall was the only Justice to find that Rooker-Feldman barred Texaco's consti-
tutional challenge. The majority relied on Younger abstention, id. at 10, thereby implic-
itly finding that the district court had jurisdiction. Justice Scalia wrote separately "only
t4 i indicate that I do not believe that the so-called Rooker-Feidman doctrine deprives the
Court of jurisdiction to decide Texaco's challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas
stay and lien provisions." Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Black-
mun, and Stevens, in their opinions concurring in judgment, all stated that Rooker-
Fddman did not bar Texaco's claims. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment);
. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring
in judngment).
Id. at 25 (Marshall,J., concurring in judgment).
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sought to prohibit review when the federal claim would succeed "only
to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before
it.''77 Feldman, however, allowed claims that constituted a "general
challenge" to the underlying rule (or presumably, by extension, the
underlying statute).78 Texaco's challenge to the constitutionality of
state stay and lien provisions for enforcement of the state court judg-
ment was the only claim before the Supreme Court in Pennzoil.' Jus-
tice Marshall argued that Texaco's challenge should be barred be-
cause the injunctive relief sought by Texaco required the federal dis-
trict court to consider the merits of Texaco's state appeal."'
This approach seems too broad: the district court was not re-
quired to make a determination as to the merits of the state court
judgment in order to decide to issue an injunction on constitutional
grounds. Texaco's argument was that the state bond and lien statutes
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses because they
would allow Pennzoil to decimate Texaco before Texaco could ap-
peal. The Second Circuit correctly recognized that any subsequent
reversal of the judgment would come too late to prevent substantial
harm to Texaco. It then explicitly accepted the findings of the Texas
state court.8' In recognizing that it would be 'justified in holding that
any threatened harm to [Texaco] from effective denial of its right of
appeal could be labeled inconsequential" only if Texaco's appeal were
"patently frivolous," 2 the Second Circuit was required neither to re-
view the state court judgment nor to conclude that the state court
"wrongly decided the issues before it."3
In 1989, two years after Pennzoi, the Supreme Court twice more
77 Id. (Marshall,J., concurring in judgment).
78 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483.
Texaco also had claimed that the state judgment "conflicted with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Williams Act, and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934." Pennzoil 481 U.S. at 6 n.6. The Second Circuit held that Rooke-
Feldman barred these claims. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir.
1986) (citing Rooker and Feldman to support the proposition that "all other claims as-
serted in Texaco's complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
since they seek appellate review on the merits of the Texas judgment in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 1257 as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court"), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
80 Pennzoi, 481 U.S. at 26 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he courts
below, by asking whether Texaco was frivolous in asserting that the trial court
erred .... undertook a review of the merits ofjudgments rendered by a state court.").
81 Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1153.
82 Id.
83 Pennzoil 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall,J., concurring in judgment).
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addressed the RookemFeidman doctrine. First, in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
the Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a state statute that
had been brought originally in state court by plaintiffs who would
have lacked standing if the suit had been brought in federal court.8
4
The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the statute was "unconstitu-
tional ... as it pertain[ed] to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases." Cur-
rent lessees, whose leases were threatened by the judgment, appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court.' , The United States, in its brief, argued
that the case should be dismissed and the state judgment left undis-
turbed, asserting that the proper course for the petitioners would be
to sue in federal trial court." The Court rejected this argument, not-
ing that the action in federal court that such an approach would re-
quire "would be an attempt to obtain direct review of the Arizona Su-
preme Court's decision in the lower federal courts, and would repre-
sent a partial inroad on Rooker-Feldman's construction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257."" This, the Court argued, "would denigrate the authority of
the state courts by creating a peculiar anomaly in the normal channels
of appellate review."'
'
Less than two weeks later, the Court decided Martin v. Vilks, in
which Justice Stevens, in a footnote to his dissent, cited Rooker, Feld-
man, and ASARCO to support the proposition that "permitting collat-
eral attacks... leads to the anomaly that courts will, on occasion, be
required to sit in review of judgments entered by other courts of
equal-or even greater-authority."" Justice Stevens argued that col-
lateral review should be confined to "certain narrowly defined defects"
because "a broad allowance of collateral review would destroy the in-
tegrity of litigated judgments, would lead to an abundance of vexa-
tious litigation, and would subvert the interest in comity between
courts.""' This position is reminiscent of the one Justice Stevens took
in his dissent in Feldman, in which he argued that Feldman was not
seeking appellate review but rather was mounting a permissible collat-
eral attack on the unconstitutional application of the District of Co-
4 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep't, 747 P.2d 1183, 1197 (Ariz. 1987).
ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 610.
Id. at 622 (citing Brief for the United States at 20 n.14).
Id. at 622-23.
Id. at 622.
490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id. at 783.
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lumbia bar admission rule, as allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ." '
The Court next discussed the doctrine the following year in
Howlett v. Rose.93 The Court cited Rooker and Feldman in a general dis-
cussion of the applicability of federal law in state courts. Specifically,
the Court noted that Rooker and Feldman supported a "rule that a fed-
eral district court cannot entertain an original action alleging that a
state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitu-
tional state statute." 4 This rule, the Court explained, "presuppose[s]
that state courts presumptively have the obligation to apply federal law
to a dispute before them and may not deny a federal right in the ab-
sence of a valid excuse."95 This was the extent of the discussion of
Rooker-Feldman.
Finally, in the 1994 case of Johnson v. De Grandy, the Court ad-
dressed the applicability of "this Court's Rooker/Feldman abstention
doctrine" to a claim brought by the federal government under section
2 of the Voting Rights Act.96 Previously, the Florida Supreme Court
had issued a declaratory judgment approving the Florida legislature's
apportionment plan, as required by the Florida state constitution, al-
though the Florida court "acknowledged that constitutional time con-
straints [had] precluded full review" and therefore recognized "the
right of any interested party to bring a § 2 challenge to the plan."'7 In
the subsequent federal proceedings, Florida argued that the claims of
the United States should be barred by Rooker-Feldman. The Court
noted that Rooker-Feldman barred "a party losing in state court ... from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's
claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights,"'
and concluded that Rooker-Feldman was "inapt" because "the United
States was not a party in the state court [and therefore] was in no posi-
tion to ask this Court to review the state court's judgment and has not
directly attacked it in this proceeding."99
The Supreme Court's treatment of Rooker-Feldman has addressed
some issues while leaving others unresolved. The most difficult out-
'2 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 489-90 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
I9 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
94 Id. at 370 n.16.
95 Id.
% 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).
97 Id. at 1001.
'' Id. at 1005-06.
'Id. at 1006.
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standing question is how Rooker-Feldman relates to other doctrines.
Feldman, which "expressly [did] not reach the question of whether the
doctrine of resjudicata forecloses litigation on [the allowed] elements
of the complaints," strongly suggests that Rooker-Feldman is distinct
from res judicata.'0  Similarly, Justice Marshall's opinion in Pennzoi4
discussing what it means for claims to be "inextricably intertwined"
uith state court judgments,"0 ' suggests that Rooker-Feldman is distinct
from collateral estoppel, as does the factual background-though not
the language-of Rooker. 2 Nevertheless, lower courts have struggled
mightily with this issue.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has noted that "although the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of preclusion may be easily
confused with each other because they both define the respect one
court owes to an earlier judgment, the two are not coextensive." 3
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has reasoned, "a claim is not 'inex-
tricably intertwined' merely because it could have been raised, but was
not, in the earlier state proceeding."'
0 4
The Sixth Circuit has described Rooker-Feldman as "a combination
of the abstention and resjudicata doctrines,"0 ' and the Eighth Circuit
has claimed that Rooker-Feldman and preclusion are "extremely simi-
lar.""'' Meanwhile, one court in the Southern District of New York
apparently has followed the approach of the Seventh Circuit by distin-
guishing RookerwFeldman from preclusion and asking, like Justice Mar-
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,487-88 (1983).
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Marshall focused not on whether the federal claims actually had
been raised or litigated in the state court proceeding but instead on whether "the fed-
eral claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it." Id.
Sce supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in Rooker
treated the Rookers' constitutional claims as though they had been raised in state
court even though they had not).
Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998).
Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit correctly
reasoned that:
[i]f the opposite were true, the Court would not have allowed the litigants in
l ,Idman to bring their general constitutional challenges to the bar admission
rule in federal district court. This conclusion is further buttressed by Pennzoi4
where separate concurrences by a majority of the Court indicated Rooker-
Fldman would not automatically bar a federal claim that was not raised in the
state court.
Id.
l'o United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995).
yo,, Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981,983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995).
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shall in Pennzoil, "whether the federal district court would necessarily
have to determine that the state court erred in order to find that the
federal claims have merit.''0 7 Another court in the Southern District,
however, has conflated the two doctrines, asserting that "at a mini-
mum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal courts of sub-
ject matterjurisdiction over litigation that is barred by the doctrines of
resjudicata and collateral estoppel." °8
Issues aside from Rooker-Feldman's relation to other doctrines re-
main unresolved as well. For example, it is not entirely clear, despite
the Court's holding in Johnson," whether Rooker-Feldman bars federal
actions by parties not participating in the earlier state suit."" It is also
unclear whether the doctrine is meant to apply only after decisions of
"highest" state courts, although it seems that Rooker-Feldman should
apply to any state judicial determination."' Similarly, it is unclear
107 Khal Charidim Kir)yasJoel v. Viii. of KiryasJoel, 935 F. Supp. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
108 Beckford v. Citibank NA, No. 00 Civ. 205 DLC, 2000 WL 1585684, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000). This approach is incorrect for the reasons noted by the Sev-
enth Circuit in Ritter, 992 F.2d 750: Feldman and Pennzoil both concluded that lower
federal courts had jurisdiction over claims that were not raised in state court.
100 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (allowing the United
States to litigate a Voting Rights Act claim because it was not a party to the earlier state
suit and was not attempting to challenge the state court judgment).
11 Lower federal courts have reached divergent results on this question. See, e.g.,
Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1367 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that, unlike preclusion
rules, Rooker-Feldman may bar a suit even absent any full and fair opportunity to litigate
in state court). But see, e.g., Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998)
(allowing a suit to proceed because the federal plaintiffs were not parties to the state
suit); Owens, 54 F.3d at 274 ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bar a suit
in federal court brought by a party that was not a party in the preceding action in state
court."). One reason for this confusion may be that lower federal courts have not in-
terpreted "the Supreme Court's brief, equivocal, and conclusory statement as binding
precedent," Sherry, supra note 7, at 1112 n.108, because the Court in Johnson noted
both that the United States was not a party to the state suit and that the United States
did not seek to challenge the state court determination. Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06.
I At least one commentator has argued that "extending Rooker-Feldman to deprive
the federal courts ofjurisdiction following activity in the states' lower courts deprives
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of its rationale." Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at
1137. This argument is apparently based on § 1257, which only addresses decisions of
the highest state courts, and on the Court's recognition in Feldman that it was being
asked to review the decision of the "highest court" in a jurisdiction. D.C. Court of Ap-
peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983). If a district court lacks appellate juris-
diction under § 1331 (the other statutory inference central to Rooker-Feldman, see supra
note 4), however, then clearly it cannot hear "appeals" from lower state courts. Fur-
thermore, the analysis in Feldman seems to depend more on the fact that the District of
Columbia's determination was judicial than on the fact that the determination was
made by the jurisdiction's highest court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (addressing
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whether Rooker-Feldman applies to state court orders that lack sufficient
finality to be protected by the Full Faith and Credit statute.112 Finally,
it is not exactly clear which actions are appeals, which are inextricably
intertwined with state court judgments, which are permissible general
challenges, and which are impermissible collateral attacks."3
D. Rooker-Feldman in Lower Federal Courts
The scarcity of Supreme Court opinions discussing the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine contrasts sharply with the doctrine's treatment in
lower federal courts, where it has experienced "explosive growth."1 4
Despite this growth-or perhaps because of it-the scope of the doc-
trine remains unclear, as lower courts have created a "complex, con-
fusing, and sometimes contradictory body of precedent."'1 Many
courts are confused and consequently are misapplying the doctrine.
Perhaps the most egregious example of this confusion and misap-
plication is Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.,"6 which has become "a
cause cl~bre among law professors. " n1 Kamilewicz emerged out of a
the issue of whether the determination of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
iasjudicial in nature). Finally, the fact that many Justices in Pennzoil discussed the ap-
plicability of Rooker-Feldman to a decision of a Texas state trial court without mention-
ing the possibility that the doctrine did not apply because the highest state court had
not rendered the state decision at least suggests that Rooker-Feldman applies to lower
state court decisions as well. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 24-26
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judg-
ment); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Lower federal courts have
generally applied Rooker-Feldman to bar suits collaterally attacking judgments of lower
state courts. See, e.g., Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988) (allow-
ing RookeFldman to bar such a case); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142
(2d Cir. 1986) (noting that "courts, including the Supreme Court, have not hesitated
to apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine" to such cases); see also Sherry, supra note 7, at
1092 n.36 (collecting cases).
This question is addressed in greater detail infra in note 222.
This question is addressed in greater detail infra in Part IV.B.
Sherry, supra note 7, at 1088; see also supra note 7 (discussing the treatment of
Rookae-'ldman by lower federal courts). This combination of lower court growth and
Supreme Court and academic silence has prompted one commentator to assert that
"(the Rooker-Fddman doctrine's] rapid rise and expansion occurred almost entirely be-
low the radar." Bandes, supra note 9, at 1175; cf Hoffman, supra note 9, at 403 n.9
("[Elven 'a little cloud may bring a flood's downpour.'" (quoting La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 258 (1957) (discussing removal of cases based on the All
Writs Act))).
: Bandes, supra note 9, at 1176.
1,7 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996).
Beermann, supra note 10, at 1232.
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class action suit filed in Alabama state court against the Bank of Bos-
ton and BancBoston Mortgage Corporation, among others. BancBos-
ton serviced the mortgages of each of the approximately 715,000 class
members, who filed suit alleging defects in the manner in which
BancBoston calculated the amount of surplus the class members were
required to maintain in their escrow accounts."'
After the plaintiff class won partial summary judgment, the state
court approved a notice of a proposed settlement drafted by the at-
torneys for the class, and the notice was sent to the members of the
plaintiff class." 9 The notice stated that "the settlement was 'fair, rea-
sonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the class' and that the
attorney fees sought were 'reasonable' and would 'not exceed one-
third of the economic benefit' to the class."02°1 One of the defendants,
Bank of Boston, objected to the notice because it failed to disclose
that the method of paying attorney fees would have the result that
"some class members would suffer an out-of-pocket loss as a result of
the lawsuit."'
21
The Alabama state court subsequently held a fairness hearing and
approved the settlement. 2  The fees-5.32% of the balance in each
account, for a total of more than $8 million3-were debited to the
accounts. Class members received a one-time interest payment rang-
ing from $0.00 to $8.76.124 The result for many class members, as
Bank of Boston had predicted, was that the fees deducted from escrow
exceeded the award.'2  Dexter Kamilewicz, for example, was awarded
$2.19 in interest and charged $91.33 in fees, for a net loss of $89.14.'
Outraged class members formed another class and sued the attor-
neys for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresen-
tation, and fraud, among other claims.12 In the same suit, they also
sued the Bank of Boston and its lawyers, although everything the bank
had done (specifically, debiting the accounts in the amount of appli-
18 Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 508.
119 Id.
20 Id. (quoting the notice of proposed settlement).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Kamilewicz, 100 F.3d at 1349 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
124 Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 508.
125 Id. at509.
126 Kamilewicz, 100 F.3d at 1349 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
127 Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 509.
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cable fees) had been authorized-indeed required-by the settle-
ment."' After noting that the "boundaries [of Rooker-Feldman], and
the line separating it from res judicata, are less than precise,"12 the
district court held that the plaintiffs were seeking to mount an im-
permissible collateral attack on the Alabama state court judgment,
"asking us to undo what the Alabama court did," and dismissed the
suit under Rooker-Feldman for lack of subject matterjurisdiction."3 "
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the
dismissal.'" The court reasoned:
IT]he plaintiffs' injuries are a result of the state courtjudgment. Their
claim in federal court is a multi-pronged attack on the approval of the
settlement regarding the attorney fees issue. Regardless of which of the
specific federal claims the district court were to consider, it would run
directly into the state court finding, entered after a two-day fairness hear-
ing-that the fees were reasonable. The federal claims are "inextricably
intert-ined" with the state court judgment, whether that judgment is
right or wrong.
The Seventh Circuit thus held that it could not determine that fraud
and malpractice had been committed without first determining that
the settlement and fee arrangement were unfair, which would require,
in effect, a reversal of the state courtjudgment to the contrary.
The representatives of the plaintiff class then filed a petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. Both requests were
denied, but five judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en
banc.' The dissent, written by Judge Easterbrook, argued that rather
than collaterally attacking the judgment, the malpractice claim "takes
the judgment as a given-indeed, it is only so long as the judgment
)-, This was in an effort to mount a collateral attack on the validity of the state
court judgment, which allegedly suffered from jurisdictional defects. Kamilewicz, 100
F.3d at 1349 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Kamile-
wicz argued that the judgment is void with respect to account holders who live outside
Alabama-for what right does Alabama have to instruct financial institutions in Florida
to debit the accounts of citizens of Maine and other states?"). This presents an inter-
esting question, which is raised again infra in Part IM.B: are collateral attacks on judg-
ments that are not entitled to full faith and credit because the rendering court lacked
jurisdiction barred by RookenFeldman?
CL1 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 95 C 6341, 1995 WL 758422, at *4
(N.D. I1. Dec. 15, 1995), affjd, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
) , Id. at "6.
)A Kamilicz, 92 F.3d at 512.
Id. at 511.
Kamilhwicz, 100 F.3d at 1349 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
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stands that the litigant has a compensable loss." l4 The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, Judge Easterbrook claimed, was irrelevant: "[T]he plaintiff
does not seek review of the decision. The original parties' entitle-
ments vis-a-vis each other are fixed by the judgment. The contest is
now between the litigant and his lawyer.' 35 Finally, Judge Easterbrook
argued that all malpractice suits are independent actions rather than
collateral attacks. 6 "That the lawyer's misconduct occurred in ajudi-
cial proceeding," Judge Easterbrook concluded, "doesn't insulate the
lawyer from liability, even when the Rooker-Feldman doctrine insulates
the judgment."
13 7
Judge Easterbrook's point is well-taken. As one commentator has
noted, "it is perfectly possible that the Alabama court was correct to
approve the class settlement but that, given adequate legal advice, the
Kamilewicz class members would have opted out. Nothing in a federal
court ruling for the plaintiffs would necessarily undermine or conflict
with the Alabama court's decree."34 That is, the settlement and fee
arrangement could be in the best interest of the class as a whole but
against the interest of some of the class members, in which case those
class members should have been fully informed of that fact and of
their right to opt out of the settlement. The Kamilewicz class mem-
bers' claim was no more a collateral attack on a state judicial proceed-
ing than were Texaco's due process and equal protection claims in
Pennzoil 139 in both cases, the injury alleged in federal court would not
have occurred but for the state court judgment, but in neither case
did the plaintiff seek to undermine thatjudgment in any way. The in-
jury in both cases was proximately caused by someone or something
other than the state court-the class counsel in Kamilewicz and the al-
legedly unconstitutional state statute in Pennzoil.
134 Id. at 1351.
135 Id. Judge Easterbrook's analysis actually went farther, asserting that "a mal-
practice action is not affected by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." Id. at 1352. "If the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to suits by the absent class members because a malprac-
tice action is a collateral attack on the order approving the settlement and awarding
attorneys' fees,"Judge Easterbrook reasoned, "then the law of preclusion (resjudicata)
should bar malpractice actions in any court, state or federal, and without regard to
which judicial system handled the first case. Yet no one thinks that." Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1353.
137 Id. at 1351.
: 3 Sherry, supra note 7, at 1124.
319 See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco
Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)).
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III. MAJOR CRITICISMS OF ROOKER-FELDMAN
Cases such as Kamilewicz, in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was
used to "close the door of the federal courthouse"'4 to apparently de-
seliing plaintiffs, have led to almost unanimous criticism of the doc-
trine in the legal scholarship on the subject. 4 ' Critics are asking
whether Rooker-Feldman is "worth only the powder to blow it up."
4 2
Their arguments are the subject of this Part.
Virtually all objections to the RookerFeldman doctrine take one of
two forms: that it is redundant because it overlaps with other doc-
trines or that it creates harmful and unjust results. Critics often argue
both-that Rooker-Feldman adds nothing of value and that it independ-
ently harms judicial administration. Nearly everyone who has written
extensively about Rooker-Feidman has taken this basic position.
4
A. The First Objection: Rooker-Feldman Is Unnecessary
The first objection, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is superfluous,
is based on the idea that all of the outcomes created by Rooker-Feldman,
or at least the desirable ones, would be created anyway by other doc-
IN Kamilaicz, 100 F.3d at 1353 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
erS 5upra note 9 (discussing scholarly treatment of the doctrine).
Rowe, supra note 3, at 1081.
Se. e.g., Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1133 (arguing that Rooker-
Feldman "might" fill a "small hole," but that the doctrine "should be abolished"); Rowe,
SUpwa note 3, at 1084 (noting that RookermFeldman does not "make[] a major contribu-
tion or difference," but leads to "some highly questionable decisions"). Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper summarily capture both objections to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in their treatise:
This doctrine is nearly redundant because most of the actions dismissed for
aiant of jurisdiction also could be resolved by invoking the claim- or issue-
preclusion consequences of the state judgments.... As yet there is no satisfac-
tory answer to the question whether the variations introduced by jurisdiction
theory are useful. The ever-present risk is that the jurisdiction label uill stop
up thought, invoking inappropriate reflexes rather than independent consid-
eration of distinctive problems. All of the desirable results achieved by the ju-
risdiction theory could be achieved by supplementing preclusion theory with
familiar theories of abstention, comity, and equitable restraint.
WRIGHT Et AL., upra note 9, § 4469.1. Not all commentators hold this view. See
Sherry, supra note 7, at 1128 (arguing that Rooker-Feldman is an "extremely valuable tool
in the management of cross-jurisdictional cases"). Significantly, some of the scholars
who criticize the doctrine find some grounds for its usefulness, suggesting that perhaps
they, are critical of the application of the doctrine rather than of the doctrine per se.
8o,', 1.g., Beermann, supra note 10, at 1209, 1213 (criticizing the doctrine but then trac-
ing an acceptable role for it).
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trines such as preclusion or abstention.'" Stated another way, the
criticism is that Rooker-Feldman "does no work." 4' Indeed, these critics
note, some courts have even merged Rooker-Feldman and the preclu-
sion doctrines, either explicitly or functionally. 4" Obvious appeals,
under this view, will be handled by resjudicata. Disguised appeals will
be addressed by Younger abstention if the state court suit is ongoing or
by preclusion doctrines if the state court suit is complete.'
The first important task, then, is to distinguish the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine from its counterparts. Does it have a unique role? Parts IV
and V of this Comment address this question, concluding that Rooker-
Feldman is necessary and uniquely applicable in certain situations.
Briefly, certain federal suits seek to undercut state judicial proceed-
ings-for example, when disappointed state court litigants file suit in
federal court alleging either that the state court judgment enforced
an unconstitutional statute or that the state court judgment itself con-
stituted a constitutional violation.'" The state court judge (or the
state court itself) may be a party to the federal suit. Since the state suit
is complete, none of the abstention doctrines apply. Depending on
the intricacies of state law, preclusion doctrines may or may not be
implicated in the federal suit. 4 , However, if the federal suit alleges
144 This, indeed, was the focus of the NotreDame Law Review's recent symposium on
Rooker-Feldman, see Symposium, supra note 9, which addressed the "major question
whether and to what extent the doctrine serves valid independent purposes of its own,"
Rowe, supra note 3, at 1083.
Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1147.
146 See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween the doctrines).
147 There is a third possibility: a state court judgment has been rendered, thus
bringing the federal suit outside Younger abstention (since there is no longer a parallel
state court proceeding), but in a form insufficient for preclusion doctrines to apply to
the federal court action. Since the federal court must give the state court judgment
the same preclusive effect it would receive within the state, see Marrese v. Am. Acad. of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) (noting that § 1738 "'commands a
federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is
taken"' (quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982))), technical
variations in state preclusion law, such as mutuality requirements, may prevent the ap-
plication of preclusion doctrines. Furthermore, the subsequent federal suit may allege
harms stemming from the state court judgment itself, again escaping preclusion doc-
trines because the harm alleged will have resulted from a separate set of operative facts
and may not have been litigated in the state proceeding. See infra Part M,.C.A (articu-
lating a nonduplicative role for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).148 .. .This narrow but important distinction is explored in greater detail in the con-
text of the hypothetical presented infra in Part V.
149 See discussion supra note 147 (raising the possibility that preclusion doctrines
will not apply to certain challenges to state court judgments in subsequent federal
court actions).
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that the state court judgment caused a constitutional harm because,
for example, the state court overstepped its bounds, preclusion doc-
trines probably will not be dispositive since the federal suit alleges a
separate claim arising from a new transaction;'5 "[ilndeed, the federal
claim-which seeks to rectify the harm done by the state suit itself-
could not have been brought in the original suit.""' Rooker-Feldman is
valuable in this context to maintain the values of federalism and com-
ity and to avoid an "end run" by disappointed litigants around preclu-
sion doctrines. '-
B. The Second Objection: Rooker-Feldman is Harmful
The second objection is more substantive than the first. It is based
on cases (such as Kamilewicz) in which Rooke-Feldman has been used to
create arguably bad results. This objection has been stated in various
forms.' , The most cogent articulation of this objection has been by
Susan Bandes, who asserts that "it has become clear that [Rooker-
Feldman] is neither harmless nor interchangeable."'5' The crux of her
argument is that RookerwFeldman leads to bad results because its juris-
dictional status is inflexible and nonwaivable, and thus it is used by
courts to trump nonjurisdictional policies, often without analysis."" In
her words:
[Rooker-Feldman] gives courts implicit permission to fail to discuss the
policies inherent in the decision to deny jurisdiction, on the apparent
1" This analysis, of course, relates to resjudicata. Collateral estoppel may bar the
federal suit if the constitutional issues were litigated and necessarily decided in the
s.tate suit. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see the hypothetical presented
ifa in Part V.
Sherry, supra note 7, at 1093.
ld. at 1094.
Se', e.g, Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1168-69 (asserting that Feldman
v'.s wrongly decided and that the doctrine's only use is barring othenise valid federal
actions for no good reason in violation of due process).
Bandes, supra note 10, at 1178.
Indeed, she points out, many decisions lack substantial analysis: "of 39 Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions on RookeraFeldman grounds between January 1996
and September 1998, 26 were one- or two-page unpublished dispositions." Id. at 1176
n.5. This, presumably, is what Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper were warning
against when they, said that "[t]he ever-present risk is that the jurisdiction label will
stop up thought, invoking inappropriate reflexes rather than independent considera-
tion of distinctive problems." WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4469.1. Of course, one
reas,-,n why the Seventh Circuit may have so many short, unreported opinions on
Rwbk-eldman is that it has the most developed case law on the subject. A recent West-
law search revealed over 200 cases in the Seventh Circuit mentioning Rooker-Feldman,
more than an) other circuit.
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theory that since the doctrine is mandatory, such policies are irrelevant.
To put it another way, it gives the illusion of a lack ofjudicial choice and
responsibility. Moreover, it seems to obviate the need to balance the
doctrine against countervailing doctrines.
According to Bandes, this problem began with Feldman, which failed
to identify the "policies at risk."' 57 She asserts that courts use Rooker-
Feldman to engage in court-initiated forum shifting, thereby creating
injustice.
As an example of this, Bandes points to Davis v. Allen County Office
of Family & Children."' In Davis, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of a § 1983 gender discrimination suit with the following analy-
sis:
Although the equal protection claim is distinct from the state court
judgment, it is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment
and the district court also lacked jurisdiction over that claim. Because
the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over this case, it should have
been dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction.
This was the extent of the court's analysis of the issue, illustrating the
(at least apparent) lack of consideration of the issues.'6' As Bandes
puts it, "[p] erhaps the court was correct, but who's to ow.
It is often unclear whether the second objection argues that
Rooker-Feldman is a bad doctrine per se or rather that Rooker-Feldman is
widely misused. The latter is certainly true, but it seems unfair to say
that Rooker-Feldman is a bad doctrine when courts and commentators
obviously do not agree on exactly what it is. Once a new framework
for the doctrine is defined, this objection should be reconsidered. In
any event, despite these arguments, it seems highly unlikely that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine will disappear in the near future.'62 Accord-
ingly, as noted at the outset of this Comment, carefully defining the
doctrine is an important goal.
156 Bandes, supra note 10, at 1178.
157 Id. at 1194; see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 139 ("[T]he Supreme Court did
not explicitly outline the policy arguments it believed supported its conclusions in
Feldman.").
158 No. 96-1953, 1997 WL 267863 (7th Cir. May 6, 1997); Bandes, supra note 10, at
1204.
159 Davis, 1997 WL 267863, at *1 (citations omitted).
10 Again, it is relevant to note that the Seventh Circuit has considered the issues
more extensively than any other circuit. See supra note 155 (discussing the extent of
the Seventh Circuit's treatment of Rooker-Feldman).
161 Bandes, supra note 10, at 1204.
162 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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IV. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ROOKER-FELDMAN
This Part attempts to identify a theoretical justification for the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
roughly analogous to the relitigation exception and should operate as
an abstention doctrine to bar collateral attacks after the first (state)
case ends. This approach clarifies what it means for issues to be "inex-
tricably intertwined" with state judicial proceedings while still prohib-
iting cases that seek to undermine those proceedings. This model is
appropriate because it is consistent with the underlying concerns of
federalism and comity.
A. The Policies Animating Rooker-Feldman
The first step in constructing an independent role for the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is to distinguish it from preclusion doctrines. One
important difference is that federalism, rather than finality, is the cen-
tral policy behind Rooker-Feldman. Suzanna Sherry has articulated this
distinction:
While preclusion doctrines serve many purposes-including finality and
forcing parties to make the first trial "the main event"-the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is first and foremost an integral part ofjudicial federal-
ism. Res judicata is about parties; Rooker-Feldman is about courts. That dif-
ference explains why Rooker-Feldman, unlike res judicata, is a jurisdic-
tional doctrine rather than an affirmative defense. It also explains why
state law, complete with individual -ariations, governs preclusion ques-
tions, but Rooker-Feldman is an unvarying federal doctrine. 
16
Thus, practically speaking, "Rooker-Feldman and the habeas exception
to it tell federal courts when they may review state court decisions; pre-
clusion rules tell them how to treat those decisions."' '
The "habeas exception" to Rooker-Feldman mentioned by Sherry
(and others' ) illustrates a broader point about federalism. Congress
:" Sherry, supra note 7, at 1101 (emphasis added).
A Id.
Set, e.g., Rowe, supra note 3, at 1082 n.3 ("Federal habeas corpus for state pris-
oners', in which the applicant brings a collateral attack on a state court conviction in
what is technically a new federal court cvil action, is commonly regarded as a statutory
exception to the Rooker-Feldiman jurisdictional limit."). But see Gruntz v. County of Los
Angeles (hi re Gruntz), 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("(Flederal
habeas-corpus law turns Rooker-Feldman on its head. Rather than leaving state court
judgments undisturbed, it provides expressly for federal collateral review of final state
court judgments and requires exhaustion of state remedies as a precondition for fed-
eral relief.... [T]hrough the statutory writ of habeas corpus Congress has created a
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can expressly authorize exceptions to the general rule that lower fed-
eral courts cannot review decisions of state courts;'" however, the fact
that Congress wrote the habeas statutes at all indicates that they are, in
fact, exceptional. 1r Collateral attacks are generally prohibited. One
reason for this is federalism: it would undercut state courts and state
law to allow collateral attacks in federal court of state-courtjudgments.
Rooker-Feldman is consistent with this general prohibition.t9
This analysis provides a starting point in the search for a justifica-
tion for Rooker-Feldman. In order to continue developing an effective
conception of Rooker-Feldman, it is important to explore other doc-
trines relating to judicial federalism. Specifically, a detour into the
law applicable in procedurally opposite cases (that is, cases originally
filed in federal court with subsequent state court suits), such as the
Anti-Injunction Act, will be necessary. ° As discussed in Part I, the two
main approaches to this problem are injunction by the federal courts
of the state court suits under the relitigation exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act and removal of the state court action to federal court
using the authority conferred by the All Writs Act. Since the second
comprehensive system of federal collateral review of state court criminal judgments.
Thus, habeas corpus is not an 'exception' to Rooker-Feldman, but a procedure with roots
in statutory jurisdiction parallel to-and in no way precluded by-the doctrine." (cita-
tions omitted)).
166 This is conceptually similar to the "expressly authorized by Act of Congress"
exception contained in the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994), although
Rooker-Feldman appears to have the opposite baseline: the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits
federal courts from enjoining state cases (thereby allowing the state suits to proceed)
unless certain exceptions are met and Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal courts from
hearing cases with certain exceptions. In both instances, however, the baseline rule is
the most respectful of the states' rights and the most consistent with a strong view of
judicial federalism. Furthermore, because in both instances the federal courts have all
of the power to decide whether or not to apply the doctrines, it seems correct that the
default rule should protect states. A broader conception, encompassing both Rooker-
Feldman and the Anti-Injunction Act, would require federal courts to respect state court
proceedings andjudgments unless certain narrow exceptions apply.
167 Otherwise the statutes would be redundant-Congress would not have to grant
jurisdiction for collateral attacks if that jurisdiction already existed. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1994) (delegating to the federal courts the power to entertain applications for
writs of habeas corpus on behalf of people in custody pursuant to state-court judg-
ments).
C16 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the Full Faith and Credit
statute).
169 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing both Rooker and Feldman to support the proposition that collateral attacks are gen-
erally disallowed).
170 One commentator has noted the significance of this comparison. Sherry, supra
note 7, at 1102-03.
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of these options, removal based on the All Writs Act, seems to be
based on an overextension of federal jurisdiction, 7' this discussion w~ill
focus on the first option-injunction of the state suit under the reliti-
gation exception.
The relitigation exception allows federal courts, in certain excep-
tional circumstances, to protect their judgments by enjoining state
suits."2 There is no real analog to this power in procedurally opposite
(that is, Rooker-Feldman) cases-the state court is unable to protect it-
self (and its judgment) in this way. 73 The Anti-Injunction Act and its
exceptions reflect a compromise of sorts between the two potentially
inconsistent policy goals of "respecting the autonomy of the state
courts as adjudicators of equal dignity to the federal courts" and "pro-
tecting superior federal interests.' 174 A similar compromise may occa-
sionally be warranted in procedurally opposite cases-that is, some-
times there may be a strong enough state interest at stake to justify the
result that a federal court does not hear a suit challenging a prior
state courtjudgment.
A consideration of when federal courts enjoin state suits based on
the relitigation exception is revealing. The authority to do so exists
"when there is something special about the federal proceeding, or
perhaps something flawed about the state proceeding-and.., those
conditions are ill-defined."'17 The Supreme Court has indicated that
the power is only available when federal injunctive relief is "necessary
to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's con-
sideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal
Hoffman, supra note 22, at 453-54.
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court of the United States may not grant an in-
Junction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
m.uts." (emphasis added)); see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
injunctive power of federal courts under the relitigation exception). As noted in Part
I, wpra, this power ultimately derives from the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)
(1994), which permits federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
o their respectivejurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
171 State courts may not enjoin federal proceedings. See, e.g., Donovan v. City of
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) ("While Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of
the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances, it
has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared rule that state
courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings." (footnotes
omitted)).
171 Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-
hqunrtion Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 290.
J 7, Id. at 304-05.
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court's flexibility and authority" to decide a case." Not surprisingly,
courts "have described the reach of the relitigation exception in terms
that are strikingly similar to the standard characterizations of Rooker-
Feldman.... [T]he exception authorizes injunctions against state
court suits that threaten to 'nullify,' 'frustrate,' 'eviscerate,' 'destroy
the effect of,' or 'render impotent' the federal judgment.'177 In other
words, federal courts are permitted to enjoin state suits that seek to
mount collateral attacks on prior federaljudgments.
7 8
One commentator, noting these similarities, has argued that
Rooker-Feldman should be a functional equivalent of the relitigation ex-
ception, "essentially direct[ing] federal courts to 'enjoin' them-
selves.""" This is justified because "[b]loth raise similar problems of
judicial federalism, and each cries out for a way to protect the integ-
rity of judgments from disappointed litigants seeking a potentially
more hospitable forum. In each case, res judicata principles protect
the winning party, but cannot always protect the court.
'080
This conclusion, while conceptually sound, is based on an ex-
tremely broad reading of the relitigation exception. 8 ' The relitigation
exception is generally viewed more narrowly as essentially coextensive
with preclusion doctrines,) 2 primarily because of the Supreme Court'sdecision in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.'8"3 In Chick Kam Choo, the
176 Ad. Coast Line R.Rv. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970).
Incidentally, although the Supreme Court did not explain the policy behind its deci-
sion in Feldman, it did cite Atlantic Coast Line and its policy discussion several times. See,
e.g., Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 482 n.16 (citing Atlantic Coast Line).
77 Sherry, supra note 7, at 1103 (footnotes omitted).
:78 Black's Law Dictionary defines "collateral attack" using similar terms: "With re-
spect to ajudicial proceeding, an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force
and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose
of attacking it." BLAcK'S LAw DiCnTONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990).
79 Sherry, supra note 7, at 1105.
80 Id.
181 Sherry acknowledges this; she recognizes that extending the relitigation excep-
tion beyond preclusion is controversial, but asserts that "lower courts do it all the
time." Id. at 1103 n.71.
182 See, e.g., Michael Finch, Fairness and Finality in Institutional Litigation: The Lessons
of School Desegregation, 4 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 109, 184-94 (1994) (discussing
the relitigation and "in aid of jurisdiction" exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act and
their narrow interpretation); Wood, supra note 174, at 304-07 (discussing the relitiga-
tion exception and its relationship to preclusion doctrines).
183 486 U.S. 140 (1988). Many recent cases involving the relitigation exception
cite Chick Kam Choo to support this conclusion. See, e.g., Regions Bank of La. v. Rivet,
224 F.3d 483, 488 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Chick Kam Choo for the proposition that
"[t]he relitigation exception requires that the claims or issues that the federal injunc-
tion is to insulate from litigation in state proceedings 'actually have been decided by
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Court noted that "[t] he relitigation exception was designed to permit
a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously
was presented to and decided by the federal court. It is founded in the
well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel. " l 4
Moreover, the Court stated that "an essential prerequisite for applying
the relitigation exception is that the claims or issues which the federal
injunction insulates from litigation in state proceedings actually have
the federal court'"); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 448 (5th
Cir. 2000) (citing Chick Kam Choo for the proposition that the relitigation exception
"'%as designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that pre-
viously was presented to and decided by the federal court'"); MLE Realty Assocs. v.
Handler, 192 F.3d 259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting more extensively from Chick
Kam Choo and stating that "the relitigation exception is narrower than the doctrine of
res judicata"); Moxado Group, Inc. v. Matagorda Ventures, Inc., No.
98CIV.6223(LMM), 2000 WL, 1154317, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (citing Chick Kam
Choo for the proposition that "'an essential prerequisite for applying the relitigation
exception is that the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litiga-
tion in state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal court'"); Blue Cross
v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135-36 (D. Conn.
21(10) (citing Chick Kam Choo for the proposition that injunctions are permitted "so
long as the purpose behind the injunctive relief is to 'protect or effectuate [a federal
court's) judgments'" (alteration in original)); Thomas v. Albright, 77 F. Supp. 2d 114,
119 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Chick Kam Choofor the proposition that "a federal Court may
enjoin an action in a state court when issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) or claim
preclusion (resjudicata) is the source of the movant's application for relief'). Other
cases reach the same result without relying on Chick Kam Choo. See, e.g., Ramsden v.
AgriBank, FCB, 214 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the relitigation excep-
tion allous litigants to protect favorable federal judgments "by enjoining repetitive
state court proceedings instead of relying on a claim or issue preclusion defense");
Budget Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Consol. Elec. Distribs., Inc., No. 97-55973, 1999 WL
685951, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (asserting that the relitigation exception applies "only if
the state action involve[s] the same parties or their privies and the same cause of ac-
tion as the final judgment on the merits in the prior federal action" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
Nevertheless, the broader reading suggested by Sherry has support as well. See,
for example, Sherry, supra note 7, at 1103-04 & nn.71-83, and the cases cited therein.
One reason may be that federal courts sometimes apply preclusion doctrines broadly
in the context of the relitigation exception, asking "whether two claims involve the
same cause of action, under which the critical question is not the relief requested or
the theory asserted but whether the plaintiff bases the two actions on the same nucleus
of operative facts," N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gillispie, 203 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (applying resjudicata very broadly, concluding in that
crse that "only one key fact... is relevant"), or acknowledging that "the actual claims
and the subject matter of the suit may differ" and "complete identity of the parties"
may not be required, Next Level Communications LP v. DSC Communications Corp.,
179 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying collateral estoppel). That is, federal courts may
interpret preclusion doctrines broadly or even occasionally go beyond them in order
to enjoin state suits that threaten to undermine prior federal courtjudgments.
f 486 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
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been decided by the federal court." s' This prerequisite is "strict and
narrow," based on "the precise state of the record and what the earlier
federal order actually said."' 86 The Court's language suggests that the
relitigation exception will never apply unless preclusion doctrines,
narrowly interpreted, also apply.
Even this narrower view of the relitigation exception is roughly
analogous to Rooker-Feldman. Similar policies of federalism and comity
are still at stake: the central question is still how interactions between
federal and state courts should be handled. A baseline rule of respect
forjudgments by the other court system should still apply. The exten-
sion of Rooker-Feldman to issues "inextricably intertwined" with state
courtjudgments, however, indicates that the broader interpretation of
the relitigation exception (whether correct or not) is a better analog,
since that extension moves Rooker-Feldman beyond preclusion by focus-
ing the analysis on a different question: whether the federal relief can
be granted without a determination that a state judicial proceeding
was wrongly decided.
87
There is still a useful lesson to be learned from the narrow version
of the relitigation exception, even if it is not a perfect analog for
Rooker-Feldman: federalism doctrines that overlap with preclusion doc-
trines are not necessarily problematic. Few commentators argue that
the relitigation exception should be abandoned, even though it al-
most never applies in situations in which preclusion doctrines do not
also apply.'8  Indeed, when the Supreme Court abandoned the reliti-
gation exception in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.," Congress
reinstated it with a statutory amendment several years later.'" More
recently, the Court reaffirmed this in Rivet v. Regions Bank when it
suggested an injunction based on the relitigation exception as an al-
ternative to improper removal based on a defensive plea of preclusion
185 Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
186 Id.
187 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing what it means for issues
to be "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgments).
188 But see Wood, supra note 174, at 304 (noting that the relitigation exception is
"difficult tojustify").
180 314 U.S. 118 (1941). Toucey "expressly disavowed the 'relitigation' exception."
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972).
190 'The congressional response to Toucey was the enactment in 1948 of the anti-
injunction statute in its present form in 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which, as the Reviser's Note
makes evident, served not only to overrule the specific holding of Toucey, but to restore
'the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision."'
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 236 (footnotes omitted).
THE ROOKER-FELDMANDOCTR[NE
by a federal judgment.'
Approaching Rooker-Feldman with the relitigation exception in
mind is therefore useful for several reasons. It provides a functional
explanation for the doctrine, taking cases out of federal jurisdiction
when they threaten state judgments. Furthermore, it shows that any
overlap of Rooker-Feldman with preclusion doctrines is not problematic.
Finally, comparison to the broader interpretation of the relitigation
exception advanced by Sherry, which is more relevant because of
Rooker-Feldman's "inextricably intertwined" language, helps direct at-
tention to the relevant policies of comity and judicial federalism that
are at issue.
B. A Conceptual Framework for Rooker-Feldman
A careful reading of the Supreme Court precedents reveals that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is designed primarily to thwart collateral
attacks on state court judgments in lower federal courts. Accordingly,
the doctrine is relevant only when a federal court plaintiff alleges that
the state court or its judgment caused the plaintiffs injury. When this
occurs, the federal suit is generally a collateral attack seeking to "undo
what the [state] court did."' 2
This formulation helps illustrate the distinction between permissi-
ble general challenges, allowed under Feldman,'1'3 and impermissible
appeals from, or collateral attacks on, issues inextricably intertwined
with state courtjudgments. As noted in Kamilewicz, the pivotal inquiry
is "whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judg-
ment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim." 9
Generally, as recently explained by the Seventh Circuit in Remer v. Bur-
linglon Area School District, Rooker-Feldman "bars federal jurisdiction
when the federal plaintiff alleges that her injury was caused by a state
court judgment. ' ' 5 Further, Rooker-Feldman bars claims that are inex-
tricably intertwined with state courtjudgments, which arise when "'the
district court is in essence ... called upon to review the state-court de-
522 U.S. 470, 478 n.3 (1998).
', Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 95 C 6341, 1995 WL 758422, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).x., See supra text accompanying notes 64-66 (discussing the Court's allowance of
Feldman's general challenge to the constitutionality of the District of Columbia bar
admission rule).
Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996).
, 205 F.3d 990,996 (7th Cir. 2000).
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cision. ' ' '196 Federal claims seeking relief that would undercut state
court judgments are impermissible collateral attacks. General chal-
lenges to statutes themselves, however, do not necessarily require fed-
eral courts to review state court decisions, which is why they are per-
mitted.
The various Supreme Court precedents support this interpreta-
tion of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The general proposition that
Rooker-Feldman bars federal jurisdiction when the federal plaintiff seeks
relief from an injury caused by a state court judgment is supported by
the Court's declarations in Rooker, ASARCO, Howlett, and Johnson.,4
7
Justice Stevens's statement in his dissent in Martin indicates that
Rooker-Feldman generally relates to collateral attacks.' 8 The extension
of Rooker-Feldman to issues inextricably intertwined with state court
judgments, supported by Feldman,"9 is explained in terms similar to
those used by Justice Marshall in Pennzoil."* Finally, for the same rea-
son Rooker-Feldman extends to issues inextricably intertwined with state
judgments, it allows general challenges. This was the holding of Feld-
man,"" and it is supported by narrow readings of, for example, the
196 Id. (quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)).
The Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted this requirement in Remer, concluding that
Rooker-Feldman did not bar federal jurisdiction when, "[a]lIthough Ms. Remer's § 1983
action [was] based on the same situation that gave rise to the state court injunction, it
[did] not call into question the validity of or impair the enforceability of the state
court injunction." Id. at 998.
197 The Court in Rooker held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
Rookers' claim that the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court violated the Constitu-
tion. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923). Similarly, in ASARCO,
the Court noted that a federal suit attempting to "obtain direct review of the Arizona
Supreme Court's decision... would represent a partial inroad" on Rooker-Feldman.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622-23 (1989). In Howlett, the Court explained
that "a federal district court cannot entertain an original action alleging that a state
court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitutional state statute."
Howlettv. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990). Finally, in Johnson, the Court reasoned
that it is impermissible to seek "what in substance would be appellate review of the
state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that
the statejudgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).
198 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rooker
and Feldman to support the general prohibition on collateral attacks).
199 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16, 486-87.
0 justice Marshall explained that a federal claim was inextricably intertwined
when it would succeed "only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the is-
sues before it" or "[w] here federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that
the state court was wrong." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Mar-
shall,0., concurring in judgment).
See 460 U.S. at 482-83 (allowing Feldman's claims "[t]o the extent that [they]
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Court's opinion in Howlett and Justice Marshall's dissent in Pennzoil.
"202
A federal court plaintiff may not claim that a state court "violated the
Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitutional state statute," 1
but that does not preclude the federal plaintiff from alleging that the
statute itself is unconstitutional (although in many cases preclusion
doctrines would bar such a claim).
In practice, the application of this approach turns on a distinction
between assertions that the state court harmed the federal plaintiff
and that the harm came from some other source. Arguments that a
state court properly applied an unconstitutional statute are permit-
ted, '1 as are claims that a state court's decision put the federal plain-
tiff in a position that made a state statute unconstitutional as ap-
plied.' However, arguments that the state court violated the Consti-
tution by applying an unconstitutional statute"116 or that the state
court's judgment itself was unconstitutional207 are not permitted. The
central question when applying Rooker-Feldman is whether the argu-
mounted a general challenge to [the bar admission rule]").
' In Howlett, the Court stated that Rooker-Feldman prohibited original federal ac-
tions "alleging that a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitu-
tional state statute." 496 U.S. at 370 n.16 (emphasis added). Read narrowly, this sug-
gests that general challenges to state statutes are permissible. This construction is con-
sistent with Justice Marshall's formulation in Pennzoil because, as in Feldman itself, such
a challenge does not require a determination that the state court "wrongly decided the
issue" before it." Pennzoil 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall,J., concurring in judgment).
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 370 n.16.
This is one possible interpretation of the holding of Feldman, which explained
that general challenges are permitted because they do not "require review of ajudicial
decision in a particular case." 460 U.S. at 487. However, as noted in Feldman, resjudi-
cata or collateral estoppel may "foreclose[] litigation on these elements of the com-
plaints." Id. at 487-88.
This was the situation in Pennzoil As discussed above, see supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text, Texaco's constitutional argument did not seek to undermine the
state court decision, despite the fact that Texaco would not have had standing to chal-
lenge the state bond and lien statutes in the absence of the decision. This is why
Robke-Jeldman should not be analyzed by asking if the federal plaintiff would have no
complaint "but for" the state courtjudgment. Cf., e.g., Remer v. Burlington Area Sch.
Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 998 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing cases holding that Rooker-Feldman pre-
cluded federal jurisdiction when "but for the state court determinations, the federal
plaintiffs would have had no complaints"). The harms of such an approach are illus-
trated by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), dis-
cussed supra in Part II.D.
,' The Court rejected this argument in both Rooker and Feldman. Feldman, 460
U.S. at 476; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); see also supra Parts
II.A, II.B (discussing Rooker and Feldman, respectively).
,,,7 The Court rejected this argument in Rooker as well. 263 U.S. at 415. The dis-
tinction between these two arguments is explored in greater detail infra in Part V.
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ment of the federal court plaintiff can coexist with the state court de-
cision or whether the argument seeks to undermine that decision.;"S
This framework does not significantly diverge from Rooker-
Feldman's statutory basis.2 ° Claims that the state court harmed a fed-
eral court plaintiff are equivalent to claims that the state court wrongly
decided the issues before it. Plaintiffs asserting these claims are ask-
ing federal courts to review judicial determinations by state courts,
which is impermissible because of our policies of federalism and com-
ity. Significantly, federalism and comity work both ways: the judg-
ment a federal court would make when using Rooker-Feldman to dismiss
a suit is similar to the one it would make when enjoining a collateral
attack on its judgment in state court under the relitigation exception.
In both cases, disappointed litigants are trying to ask another court
system to undercut a judgment validly rendered. Viewed this way,
Rooker-Feldman simply bars creative collateral attacks on state court
judgments.
This approach, however, arguably fails to escape the problems as-
sociated with Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional status. 21 A possible solu-
tion to these problems may lie in the Supreme Court's reference to
the "Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine."21 1 One scholar has argued
that the proper role for Rooker-Feldman is "as an abstention doctrine
under which disappointed state court litigants may not go to federal
district court to complain about harm they suffered at the hands of
state courts."21 2 The problem with this approach is that Rooker-Feldman
cannot logically be an abstention doctrine and remain consistent with
its basic premise: 213 How can a court abstain from exercising jurisdic-
tion if it has no jurisdiction in the first place?
The answer to this question is that the true jurisdictional case, in
which a plaintiff appeals from a state court judgment to a federal dis-
208 This, of course, roughly tracks Justice Marshall's formulation of the doctrine in
PennzoiL
209 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory basis for the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
210 See supra Part III.B (discussing the lack of analysis by courts applying Rookerv
Feldman, arguably because of its jurisdictional status). That is, despite a sound theo-
retical basis, the undesirable practical results may still remain because "the jurisdiction
label will stop up thought." WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4469.1. It would be reason-
able, however, to assume that by identifying the policies at issue this approach might
facilitate better analysis.
2n1 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005 (1994).
2 Beermann, supra note 10, at 1213.
23 That is, that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from state
courts.
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tfict court in violation of §§ 1257 and 1331, is rare. Rooker-Feldman
may only be jurisdictional "in the very narrow situations in which liti-
gants ask the federal courts to rehear issues identical to those on
which they have already obtained state court decisions," or when suits
"are facially styled as appeals."21 That is, the jurisdictional bar based
on statutory construction should be construed narrowly, rather than
expansively. Outside those narrow situations-for example, when
federal suits raise issues that are not identical to the issues in a prior
state suit, but are inextricably intertwined with the state court judg-
ment-RookerwFeldman can, perhaps, exist as an abstention-like doc-
trine. Formulated in this manner, Rooker-Feldman would instruct fed-
eral courts to abstain from hearing impermissible collateral attacks on
state courtjudgments.
Applying Rooker-Feldman as a doctrine of abstention rather than
one of subject matter jurisdiction is again consistent with the underly-
ing policies of federalism and comity.2l5 The various abstention doc-
trines, along with other doctrines and practices such as the Anti-
Injunction Act and certification, allow federal courts to respect state
court proceedings. All of the abstention doctrines, however, apply ei-
ther before a state suit begins or when there are parallel proceedings
in both state and federal court21 6 Treating Rooker-Feldman as an ab-
stention that applies after the state suit has concluded would extend
the protection granted to state courts by the other abstention doc-
.11 Bandes, supra note 9, at 1179 & n.19.
The abstention doctrines are grounded in federalism and comity; indeed,
l'oungiritself described these policies as encompassing:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it,
is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the pro-
found debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound
to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federal-
ism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any
more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these
courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensi-
tiv.ity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and
in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to indicate and
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that ill not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
1'. Sr supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the various abstention
dictfines).
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trines in a logical and consistent way. It would also recognize the ad-
ditional harm to federalism and comity presented by interjurisdic-
tional collateral attacks.
This approach resolves some of the confusion surrounding Rooker-
Feldman, but it also raises new questions. Specifically, besides permit-
ted collateral attacks such as habeas corpus,217 coram nobis, "' and the
like, are there other exceptions to Rooker-Feldman?219 For example,
does Rooker-Feldman bar collateral attacks on judgments suffering from
jurisdictional defects? 220 Does it bar collateral attacks that would be
permitted by courts in the rendering forum?22' Finally, does Rooker-
Feldman bar collateral attacks on state court determinations that lack
finality?.22 Courts seeking to adopt this framework would have to ad-
217 See supra text accompanying notes 165-69 (discussing the relationship between
habeas corpus and Rooker-Feldman).
218 Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and audita querela have generally been replaced
by motions for relief from judgment. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("Writs of coram
nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.").
219 See, e.g., Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles (In re Gruntz), 202 F.3d 1074, 1079
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("In apparent contradiction to the Rooker-Feldman theory,
bankruptcy courts are empowered to avoid state judgments, to modify them, and to
discharge them. By statute, a post-petition state judgment is not binding on the bank-
ruptcy court to establish the amount of a debt for bankruptcy purposes. Thus, final
judgments in state courts are not necessarily preclusive in United States bankruptcy
courts." (citations omitted)); id. at 1080 ("Congress, because its power over the subject
of bankruptcy is plenary, may by specific bankruptcy legislation create an exception to
[the principle that validly rendered judgments are not subject to collateral attack] and
renderjudicial acts taken with respect to the person or property of a debtor whom the
bankruptcy law protects nullities and vulnerable collaterally."); Hachamovitch v. De-
Buono, 159 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Rooker-Feldman may be a dubious ground for
a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction over a case ... that falls within [a] statutory
grant of subject matterjurisdiction .... ").
Thesejudgments are not generally entitled to receive full faith and credit. See
supra note 14 (discussing exceptions to the general rule that judgments are to be af-
forded full faith and credit). Judge Easterbrook raised this question in Kamikwyl.
Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1350 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("[A] judgment that is not entitled to
full faith and credit does not acquire extra force via the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.").
221 This is a related, but slightly different, question. The Fifth Circuit has held that
Rooker-Feldman does not bar collateral attacks "when that same action would be allowed
in the state court of the rendering state." Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir.
1995); see also Beermann, supra note 10, at 1213 (advocating a Rooker-Feldman absten-
tion doctrine in which federal actions are barred "when the state courts would not en-
tertain the action").
222 An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the general
framework presented here, but it would broaden Rooker-Fedman by allowing the doc-
trine to apply in situations in which state court proceedings had not yet concluded.
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dress these questions.
C. Is This Responsive? A Reconsideration of the
Objections to Rooker-Feldman
1. The First Objection
The approach set out in this Part traces a role for RookermFeldman
that is not redundant. The thrust of the first objection was that exist-
ing doctrines-preclusion and abstention-adequately handle the
typical Rooke-Feldman situation. 22 Rooker-Feldman prevents federal
courts from hearing suits that mount collateral attacks on prior state
courtjudgments. Preclusion doctrines, which may overlap with Rooker-
Feldman in many cases, will not always serve this function. There are at
least two reasons for this: technical variations in state preclusion law,
such as mutuality requirements, may prevent the application of pre-
clusion doctrines;: and collateral attacks may allege that the state
judgment itself harmed the federal court plaintiff, thereby escaping
preclusion doctrines because the harm alleged will have resulted from
a separate set of operative facts and may not have been litigated in the
state proceedings>:'
Some critics implicitly acknowledge that preclusion doctrines will
not always prevent inteijurisdictional collateral attacks. Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper, for example, have stated that "[aill of the
desirable results" achieved by Rooker-Feldman "could be achieved by
Such a broad reading would be consistent with the command of Feldman that lower
iuderial courts may not reviewjudicial determinations of state courts, D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983), but it may be unnecessary because of
S ',wvfo abstention's applicability to ongoing state proceedings, Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971); s, '.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987) (applying
I',,m, w abstention in order to defer to "pending state proceedings"). In any event,
-[t ihe applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to interlocutory decisions of state
oijurt. is an open question." Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699,
7012 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998).
t.i %upm Part III.A (discussing this objection to Rooke-Feldman).
Federal co urts are obliged to give state court judgments only the same preclu-
sih. effect, and no more, that they would receive in courts of the rendering state. Mar-
ie'se v. Am. \cad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). If the state in
which the initial judgment was rendered had a mutuality requirement, a disappointed
litigant seeking to attack the initial judgment could escape preclusion doctrines by
adding another party to the dispute-either the state court judge or the state court
(raising issues of sovereign and judicial immunity) or someone else.
"' This wa. apparently the case in Rooker See supra notes 4546 and accompanying
text (discussing Rooko). The hypothetical discussed infia in Part V provides another
example of this phenomenon.
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supplementing preclusion theory with familiar theories of abstention,
comity, and equitable restraint."226 If preclusion doctrines alone were
adequate, they would not need to be supplemented. Furthermore,
"supplementing" preclusion theory to avoid collateral attacks may vio-
late Marrese's command, grounded in "concerns of comity and federal-
ism," that states, not federal courts, determine the preclusive effects of
state-court judgments.2 7 Finally, supplementing preclusion in such a
way may not be effective since current abstention doctrines operate
only before or during, and not after, state suits.
"
2
s
The policies of comity and federalism indicate that interjurisdic-
tional collateral attacks generally should not be allowed. Treating
Rooker-Feldman as an abstention doctrine applicable after state suits
have ended addresses this concern in a way that is consistent with the
"familiar theories" advanced by Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper.
It also avoids the conflict with Marrese by giving another tool besides
preclusion to federal courts seeking, in the interest of comity, to avoid
hearing collateral attacks on state judgments. Rooker-Feldman uniquely
fills this role by providing that only the Supreme Court (on appeal) or
a state court (in a new action or on a motion for relief from judg-
ment) can hear these suits.
2. The Second Objection
The second objection to Rooker-Feldman was that it leads to bad re-
sults. This Part will argue that Rooker-Feldman, properly defined and
applied, avoids this problem. Cases with questionable outcomes, such
as Kamilewicz,20 and cases with little or no analysis, such as Davis, '" re-
sult from misapplication and confusion. Furthermore, courts relying
on a "but for" test-that is, applying Rooker-Feldman when the federal
court plaintiff would have no claim but for the state courtjudgment-
are overapplying the doctrine.2  Identifying these problems and pre-
226 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 4469.1.
A27 larrese 470 U.S. at 380.
228 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the various abstention
doctrines).
2269 See supra Part III.B (discussing this objection to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
230 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
231 Davis v. Allen County Office of Family & Children, No. 96-1953, 1997 WL
267863 (7th Cir. May 6, 1997).
232 The Seventh Circuit uses such a test. See, e.g., Remer v. Burlington Area Sch.
Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 998 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Kamilewicz to support the proposition
that Rooker-Feldman precludes federal jurisdiction when "but for the state court deter-
minations, the federal plaintiffs would have had no complaint"). This approach is er-
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senting a clear framework for RookerFeldman may help address these
issues.
The result in Kamilewicz-that the doors of the federal courthouse
were closed, apparently in error, to a deserving plaintiff-would be
avoided by the framework presented in this Comment. The malprac-
tice claim at issue in Kamilewicz was not a collateral attack on the Ala-
bama state court judgment; it is possible that both the state court
judgment that the settlement was fair to the class and Kamilewicz's
claim that his attorneys should have advised him to opt out of the set-
tlement could be correct.2 -1 This was noted in Judge Easterbrook's
dissent from the denial of a rehearing en banc&a and it has been
noted by several commentators as well.2", The problem in Kamilewicz
was not with RookeiFeldmnan but with the faulty logic of the majority.
Similarly, the result in Davis-that Rooker-Feldnan was applied with
virtually no analysis-might also be avoided by the framework pre-
sented in this Comment. Commentators objecting to the application
of the doctrine without appropriate analysis have argued that this oc-
curs because of Rookeo-Feld man's jurisdictional status.2"e While this ar-
gument may be overstated,1 7 it too is addressed by the framework pre-
sented here: courts typically provide extensive policy analysis when
rinicus because it confuses RooketF Mmnan with standing. See supra note 205 and ac-
compan)ing text.
S ,' %uprn notes 134-38 and accompanying text (explaining this argument). The
result might have been different if, for example, the state court had addressed and
necessarily decided the opt-out issue in its opinion. Cf Thomas v. Albright, 77 F. Supp.
2d 114, 119-23 (D.D.C. 1999) (relying on the relitigation exception to the Anti-
Irjunction Act to enjoin a state malpractice suit seeking to mount a collateral attack on
a judgment of the district court upholding a settlement agreement after explicitly ad-
dressing and deciding the claims of the state court plaintiffs). This shows one way in
which R,okfi ldman can sometimes overlap with preclusion doctrines.
' Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("[P]laintiffs' claim
against the Htffinan class counsel ... is not a collateral attack on ajudgment.").
F'., Sherry, supra note 7, at 1124.
.S, ., WRIGHTETAL., supra note 9, § 4469.1 (describing an "ever-present risk"
that R,,k i-Fdmau'sjurisdictional label will "stop up thought"); Bandes, supra note 10,
at 1178 (asserting that Rookei-Feldmnan "gives courts implicit permission to fail to discuss
the policies inherent in the decision to deny jurisdiction, on the apparent theory that
since the doctrine is mandatory, such policies are irrelevant").
,.7 Many cases applying Rookei Feldman, after all, engage in substantial analysis, and
there is just as much flexibility in jurisdictional doctrines as in other doctrines. Fur-
thermore, Davis may have had such little analysis because the case was unreported and
accordingly the rationale was not fully explained. Finally, as noted supra in note 155,
the Seventh Circuit may have short, unreported opinions on RookaeFeldman (such as
Dmi) because it has the most developed case law on the subject.
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applying the various abstention doctrines or the relitigation excep-
tion. The problem of failing to identify the "policies at risk" " disap-
pears when all of the relevant competing policies are fully explained.
Any court considering the application of Rooker-Feldman should ad-
dress the issues of jurisdiction, abstention, federalism, collateral at-
tacks, and preclusion. In any event, recognizing the policies animat-
ing Rooker-Feldman and treating it as an abstention doctrine may alter
its "status as jurisdictionally inflexible, its amorphous relationship to
federalism, and its insufficient articulation" which currently make
"unprincipled application too easy," thereby avoiding results such as
the one in Davis.23 9
V. WHEN AND How SHOULD THIS FRAMEWORK APPLY?
It is easier to consider the approach to Rooker-Feldman presented in
Part IV through an illustration. The following hypothetical, as should
be immediately clear, is based loosely on Bush v. Palm Beach Countqy
240Canvassing Board. Imagine an extremely close election generating
several lawsuits. Imagine further that claims regarding a recount
could potentially be raised under both state and federal law, as was the
case in Florida. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the relevant
claims are that the state election law was violated and that the state
election law violates the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment.
Imagine, for the purposes of this hypothetical, that a single suit
was filed in state court. Several outcomes are possible: 1'" the state
court could rule on both the state law and the constitutional issues,
and a subsequent suit could be filed in federal court raising the con-
stitutional issues again ("Scenario 1"); the state court could rule on
the state law issues only, and a subsequent suit could be filed in fed-
eral court raising the constitutional issues ("Scenario 2"); or the state
court could rule on the state law issues only, and a subsequent suit
could be filed in federal court alleging that the state court decision
itself violated both federal law and the separation of powers provisions
of the Constitution ("Scenario 3").
Should the federal suit be permitted in Scenario 1? Based on pre-
clusion doctrines, the answer is clearly no-both resjudicata and col-
238 Bandes, supra note 9, at 1194.
239 Id. at 1204.
24u 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000).
241 The list presented here is, of course, noninclusive.
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lateral estoppel should apply to the federal court claims.2 ' But what
about RookerFelddman? Because the state court explicitly determined
that the statutes were constitutional, general claims that the statutes
are unconstitutional would be barred.1 3 Similarly, claims that the
state court gave effect to statutes that were unconstitutional and there-
fore violated the Constitution itself would also be barred.2"  In Sce-
nario 1, then, both Rooker-Feldman and preclusion would bar the fed-
eral claims. In this situation, the doctrines overlap."4
In Scenario 2, the state court ruled only on state law and the sub-
sequent federal suit raised the constitutional issues. Again, the pre-
clusion analysis is relatively straightforward: collateral estoppel would
not apply since the constitutional issues were not litigated and neces-
sarily decided in the state suit, but res judicata probably would apply
because the constitutional claims should have been raised in the state
suit. 1 The Rooker-Feldman analysis is similar to that in Scenario 1, but
slightly different. Once again, if the federal court claims asserted that
the state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to unconstitu-
This result might not hold in a jurisdiction that had a mutuality requirement
for its preclusion doctrines if the federal court plaintiff added additional parties, such
as the state court judge or the state court, to the second suit.
The general challenges allowed by Feldman are only permissible when they "do
not require review of ajudicial decision in a particular case." D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 487 (1983). That is, because the state court determined the
constitutional issues in Scenario 1, which it was entitled to do, see Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990) ("[S]tate courts presumptively have the obligation to apply
federal law to a dispute before them."), the general challenge in the federal suit would
amount to a collateral attack on that judicial determination of the state court, and as
such would be disallowed by Rooker-Feldman.
I According to the Court's statement in Howlett this claim would be barred. See
luw,'t, 496 U.S. at 370 n.16 ("[A] federal district court cannot entertain an original
action alleging that a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an uncon-
stitutional state statute.").
-21 The overlap in Scenario 1 is admittedly confusing. It is this situation that gives
rise to the two common objections to Rooker-Feldman discussed supra in Part III: that it
is unnecessary and that it leads to bad results. In this case, it is unnecessary to the out-
come-although that may not be a reason to discard the doctrine, see supra text ac-
companying notes 185-88 (arguing that the relitigation exception is similarly redun-
dant but that this is not necessarily problematic)-and it has the potential to create
unusual results because it is confusing. It is no more confusing, however, than the col-
lateral estoppel inquiry into whether issues were litigated and necessarily decided; in-
deed, part of the Rookei-Feldman analysis in Scenario 1-arguably the most confusing
part-is nearly identical to the collateral estoppel analysis.
-', Indeed, it is generally required that "federal question[sJ arising from ... state
case[s] must first be presented to the state courts for decision." Howlett, 496 U.S. at
37o n.16.
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tional statutes, the claims would be barred.247 To the extent that the
federal court claims mounted a general attack on the constitutionality
of the state statutes, however, they would not be collateral attacks on
the state judgment, read narrowly, and they would therefore be per-
2411mitted by Rooker-Feldman. Scenario 2 thus represents a situation in
which preclusion would apply and Rooker-Feldman would not.
Finally, in Scenario 3, the state court again ruled only on state law
and the subsequent federal suit alleged that the state judgment itself
violated federal laws and the Constitution. The federal claim is differ-
ent from the one in Scenario 2 because it alleges that the state court
decision itself created an independent constitutional violation rather
than that it enforced an unconstitutional statute.2n' ' This Scenario pre-
sents questions of sovereign and judicial immunity that are beyond
the scope of this Comment. The preclusion analysis in Scenario 3 is
more interesting: collateral estoppel again would not apply because
the federal issues were not litigated and necessarily decided in the
state suit, and resjudicata arguably also would not apply because the
harm alleged arose from a separate set of operative facts. Rooker.
Feldman, however, would apply to bar the federal suit because the suit
seeks to undermine the state courtjudgment.
It is important to distinguish Scenario 3 from both Pennzoil and
Kamilewicz. In Pennzoil, Texaco claimed that, after the state court deci-
sion, it was placed in a position that made the application of the Texas
bond and lien statutes unconstitutional.20 Rooker-Feldman did not bar
these claims because Texaco did not mount a collateral attack on the
state courtjudgment. Similarly, the claim in Kamilewicz was, at least in
part,251 that even if the Alabama court had correctly determined that
247 1d.
248 This is exactly the type of general challenge allowed by Feldman, because it doesnot require review of a state judicial decision. 460 U.S. at 487; cf supra note 243.
Both of these arguments were presented to the Court in Rooker. Rooker v. Fi-
delity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923). See generally supra Part II.A (discussing
Rooker).
20 Texaco also claimed that the state judgment violated federal law and the Con-
stitution, but the Second Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman barred these claims. Texaco
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Rooker and Feldman to
support the proposition that "all other claims asserted in Texaco's complaint must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction since they seek appellate review on the
merits of the Texas judgment in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
See supra note 128 and accompanying text (noting that the Kamile-wicz plaintiffs
also tried to sue the Bank of Boston in order to mount a collateral attack on the Ala-
bama statejudgment).
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the settlement was fair to the class as a whole, the class counsel should
have adxised the Kamilewicz plaintiffs to opt out of the settlement.
Again, the federal claim was not that the state court had erred. In
Scenario 3, however, the premise of the federal suit is essentially that
the state court "wrongly decided the issues before it.",
2
Scenario 3 thus represents a situation in which Rooker-Feldman
alone, and not preclusion or abstention, would apply. In other in-
stances, such as Scenario 1, the doctrines overlap, but in Scenario 3
they do not. The result in Scenario 3, that Rooker-Feldman bars the
federal claims, seems to be correct: the federal claims will not be pre-
cluded, but they are counter to the principles of federalism and com-
ity articulated, among other places, in Younger v. Harris."5-1 It is im-
proper for lower federal courts to engage in such re-view-whether
considered appellate review or a collateral attack-of a state court.:51
In the language of Rooker-Feldman, the federal claims in Scenario 3 are
"inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment because they
can only succeed to the extent that the state court was wrong.
CONCLUSION
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine currently "encourages jurisdictional
helplessness, because it offers federal courts the option of lightening
their docket without taking the responsibility for ousting any particu-
lar federal claimant."' A much better approach would be to consider
the context of each case and analyze the particular state and federal
interests at stake, determining when, in the interests of federalism and
comity, a federal court should abstain from hearing a suit that
amounts to a collateral attack on a prior state court judgment. This
type of 'judicial articulating and weighing of competing interests"
occurs frequently in the context of the relitigation exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act and the various abstention doctrines, which are
animated by the same policies as Rooker-Feldman. An approach to
Rooke-Feldman offering a clear recognition of those policies would
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment).
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); see supra note 215 (quoting Younger); see also Texaco, 784
F.2d at 114243 (discussing this policy rationale for Rooker-Feldman).
_,, Ste, d.., Art. Coast Line R.R v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296
(1Y70) ("[Liower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of
state, decisions.").
Bandes, supra note 9, at 1207.
Id. at 1206.
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overcome the two strongest criticisms of the doctrine by simultane-
ously giving Rooker-Feldman an independent purpose and avoiding
misapplication due to a lack of analysis.
